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Blame, Praise, and the 
Structure of Legal Rules 
Lawrence M. Solan† 
In Honor of Roger Shuy* 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay discusses the implications of some important 
work in experimental philosophy to criminal law and tort law. 
In a series of extremely interesting and challenging studies, 
Joshua Knobe and others have demonstrated that we are more 
likely to attribute intent to those whose actions lead to bad 
results than to those whose actions lead to good results. In one 
version, a middle-management executive boasts that his new 
process will not only make money for the company, but also 
help the environment. His boss approves the new venture, but 
makes it clear that he doesn’t care about helping the 
environment, he’s doing it for the money. Sure enough, the new 
process does help the environment. Yet we do not give the boss 
credit for intentionally having made the environment cleaner. 
In contrast, when the mid-level manager laments that the new 
process will make money at the expense of damaging the 
environment, we attribute to the boss who approved the new 
venture an intent to have harmed the environment.1 This 
asymmetry is potentially important. It suggests that we are 
somehow designed to lash out at wrongdoers, making us all 
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Gould School of Law, where I presented earlier versions of this work. Thanks also to 
Steven Bentsianov for his most valuable research. 
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 1 See Joshua Knobe, Intentional Actions and Side-Effects in Ordinary 
Language, 63 ANALYSIS 190 (2003).  
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moral actors. If the asymmetry is the result of our attributing 
blame too easily, then it suggests that prosecutors and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers might have it easier than the definitions of 
crimes and torts would suggest. It has received so much 
attention that it has been given a name: “The Knobe [E]ffect.”2  
In this essay, I suggest an explanation for the 
asymmetry by looking more closely at the language of intent 
and causation. Intent is built into our speech without our 
having to point it out. We mention intent in everyday 
communication only when a person’s state of mind deviates 
sufficiently from baseline expectations. If you tell someone you 
went out for dinner last night, you do not need to tell them that 
you did it on purpose. By looking at the circumstances in which 
we do make mention of intent in ordinary speech, we can begin 
to draw inferences about what our baseline expectations are. I 
argue here that the Knobe Effect results from the fact that our 
baseline is that people will act within social norms to 
accomplish socially-useful goals. This means, somewhat 
ironically, that our bias toward blame results from our 
tendency to expect the good. To the extent that social norms 
track moral judgment, the asymmetry between blame and 
praise suggests that moral judgment affects cognitive judgment 
as Knobe claims. 
As for causation, I agree with Knobe that moral 
considerations pervade our judgments. But they do so, as Mark 
Alicke3 and others4 have argued, when there are competing 
causal stories consistent with the facts, and we need to choose 
among them. Moral judgment influences our choice among 
possible, legitimate causal accounts, but it is not sufficient to 
create a causal account from one that would not otherwise be 
available. 
In an earlier essay, I argued that blaming arises 
naturally because its primitives—the recognition of a bad 
outcome, causation, and attribution of state of mind—are such 
basic cognitive functions that moral attribution is cognitively 
  
 2 See generally Adam Feltz, The Knobe Effect: A Brief Overview, 28 J. MIND 
& BEHAV. 265 (2008) for a discussion of some of the literature citing this asymmetry.  
 3 Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 368 (1992) [hereinafter Alicke, Culpable Causation]. For Alicke’s reaction to 
Knobe’s work, see Mark D. Alicke, Blaming Badly, J. COGNITION & CULTURE 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 2-4, available at http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/Alicke.pdf) 
[hereinafter Alicke, Blaming Badly]. 
 4 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of 
Self Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (2008). 
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inexpensive.5 Knobe pointed out in response that my theory had 
no way of accounting for the kind of asymmetry between blame 
and praise illustrated by his corporate executives.6 That is, if 
blaming is readily available cognitively because it is triggered 
whenever a person with a bad state of mind causes a bad 
outcome, and judgments about causation, valence, and state of 
mind are made routinely for other reasons in any event, then 
praising should be just as easy since it is triggered by exactly 
the same considerations, the only difference being the valence 
of the outcome. Knobe was correct.7 This essay offers an 
explanation for the asymmetry and explores some legal 
ramifications. 
Should the law care about whether we blame more 
easily than we give credit and the reasons for any such 
asymmetry? Whether or not it should care, it does care. For the 
most part, the legal system is structured around baseline 
expectations of appropriate conduct consistent with social 
norms, with civil or criminal sanctions following from failure to 
meet these norms. The system expects people to behave 
properly, and it reacts negatively when they do not. There is 
far less reward for good conduct than there is punishment for 
bad. Furthermore, the legal system puts a great deal of weight 
on causation and intent in areas such as criminal law and 
torts. To the extent that our judgments of causation and intent 
are at odds with the moral intuitions of the citizenry, the law 
stands to lose some of its moral force. 
The first part of this essay consists of my effort to 
explain the Knobe Effect. The second touches on ways in which 
the asymmetry it describes is relevant to our understanding of 
how the law is structured. In particular, it is no accident that 
legal systems are generally organized around a set of high 
expectations for conduct and sanctions for falling below those 
standards, and not as an incentive system in which the 
expectations are low, and rewards are given for rising above 
them. While economists regard these approaches as equivalent, 
they are not the same from a psychological perspective. 
Further, the negative branch of the Knobe Effect—that we 
  
 5 Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003). 
 6 Joshua Knobe, Cognitive Processes Shaped by the Impulse to Blame, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 929, 930 (2006). 
 7 Lawrence M. Solan, Where Does Blaming Come From?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
939, 939 (2006). 
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construe unwanted side-effects as intentionally caused when 
we knew they would occur—plays an important role in tort law. 
In fact, Section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
specifically calls for known negative side effects of an 
intentional act to be treated themselves as intentional acts.8 
However, the boundaries of this doctrine are currently a matter 
of dispute. Experimental work by Knobe and others 
demonstrates that at least some version of this principle is 
consistent with everyday moral intuitions. However, the 
Restatement distinguishes more than Knobe does between 
moral judgment on the one hand, and the attribution of actual 
intent on the other. Based on empirical findings by Bertram 
Malle and others, I suggest that the Restatement’s position is 
probably the better one. The third part of the essay is a brief 
conclusion. 
I. INTENT, PRAISE, AND BLAME 
A. Intent in Ordinary Speech 
What does it mean to do something intentionally? 
Psychologist Bertram Malle and Joshua Knobe conducted 
numerous experiments on the folk psychology of intention.9 
Basically, prototypical intent involves an individual with the 
skill to carry out a task performing that task because he 
intends to do it, knowing that he is engaging in that task, and 
wanting to achieve the predictable result of the action. Thus, 
intent is most often acknowledged when an individual intends 
not only his actions, but also intends the foreseeable 
consequences of his actions. In other words, the folk psychology 
of intent includes both general intent and specific intent, to use 
the legal terminology.10 This explains why law students find it 
strange when a tort or crime requires only general intent. They 
are not used to disaggregating their ordinary sense of what it 
means to intend an action. 
  
 8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
 9 See Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, The Folk Concept of Intentionality, 
33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1997); see also Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. 
Moser, Intentional Action, 28 NOÛS 39 (1994). 
 10 The distinction is commonplace in legal analysis. For one recent statement, 
see People v. Chance, 189 P.3d 971, 981 (Cal. 2008) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (“A 
specific intent crime is an offense that requires the defendant to not only intend to do 
an act but to also intend to achieve a consequence, such as (in the case of assault) the 
intent ‘to commit a violent injury on the person of another’ whereas a general intent 
crime requires only that the defendant intend to do the act.” (citations omitted)). 
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This is not to say that all five elements must always be 
present for us to attribute intent. Subsequent experimentation 
suggests that some conditions are necessary, others 
prototypical.11 For example, someone who plans to do a bad 
thing for a bad purpose and then finds himself having done this 
bad thing without being aware that he did it will be judged to 
have at least some intent. Nonetheless, when all of these 
elements are present, people are most likely to agree that an 
actor has acted intentionally. 
One way of learning about how we understand intent is 
to examine how we talk about it. Let us look more closely at 
how we speak of intent in ordinary language. Consider an 
individual, Mario, who has a ticket for an early morning flight, 
say, 6:30 a.m. He wants to get to the airport an hour early, and 
knows from experience that it takes about fifteen minutes to 
get there by car. The day before, he calls a taxi service and asks 
for a cab to pick him up at his home at 5:15 a.m. and drive him 
to the airport. And that is just what happens. Upon arriving at 
the terminal, he pays the driver, including a tip, enters the 
airport, checks in at the counter, passes through security, buys 
a newspaper to read on the flight, has time for a quick cup of 
coffee at the airport’s Starbucks, of which he takes advantage, 
and then boards the plane. 
Every one of these events is intentional. But it would 
sound very strange—indeed, almost demented—to point that 
out. Thus, we do not say: 
(1) Mario intentionally called a taxi service and purposely asked for 
a cab to pick him up at his home at 5:15 a.m. 
(2) Mario paid the driver on purpose and intentionally gave him a 
tip. 
(3) Mario got out of the car with intent and then intentionally 
entered the airport. 
And so on. 
We do not say these things, because we assume that he 
did them on purpose without ever mentioning his state of mind. 
Linguistic pragmatics tells us what is so strange about (1)-(3). 
In everyday interaction, we assume that the speaker intends to 
advance the conversation in a cooperative way, and we draw 
  
 11 See Bertram F. Malle, Intentionality, Morality, and Their Relationship in 
Human Judgment, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 87 (2006). 
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inferences about the speaker’s intent by evaluating what is 
said against this underlying assumption. That is why if Mario 
tells his wife Adela, “I have a meeting at 5:30” in response to 
her earlier remark, “I think we need milk,” Mario will have 
understood Adela to have asked him to buy milk, and Adela 
will have understood Mario to have said that he will not be able 
to do so. This is true even though Adela never asks Mario to 
buy milk, and Mario never says that he cannot buy milk. It 
appears from this snippet that the store at which he would 
have bought the milk will close before he has a chance to get 
there and they both know that fact, even though neither of 
them has said anything about it. Grice’s Cooperative Principle 
(“[m]ake your contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange in which you are engaged”),12 and more specifically, 
his maxim of relation (“[b]e relevant”), capture this process.13 
Mario assumes that Adela mentioned the milk for a reason, 
and Adela assumes that Mario intended a relevant contribution 
to the conversation when he mentions the time of his meeting, 
and draws appropriate inferences about the milk. 
The Cooperative Principle also explains what is wrong 
with saying that Mario intentionally did all the things he did to 
get to the airport. Intent is built into our models of these 
events, including both intent to perform the actions and intent 
to achieve the foreseeable results of those actions. Grice’s 
maxim of quantity (“[d]o not make your contribution more 
informative than is required”)14 operates to inhibit us from 
expressing a state of mind that we already infer from the 
language and context. For this reason, any mention of Mario’s 
intentional state of mind implies that he is acting with a level 
of intent in addition to the intent that we would ordinarily 
understand without further mention of his state of mind. 
Otherwise, there would be no reason to mention it at all. 
This does not mean that intent must be part of the 
semantics of the verbs in these sentences, which include call, 
ask, pay, give, get out of, and enter. For example, I can 
unintentionally call a taxi by pushing the wrong speed-dial 
button on my telephone. Perhaps I thought I was calling a 
  
 12 H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 3: SPEECH 
ACTS 41, 45 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975). 
 13 Id. at 46. 
 14 Id. at 45-46. 
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friend to take me to the airport, but I inadvertently called the 
taxi service. In that case, I can say, 
(4) I inadvertently called a taxi service to take me to the airport. 
 a. Thank goodness that mistake didn’t cause any trouble.  
 b. It cost me a fortune. 
In (4a) the error has led to a good outcome, in (4b) a bad one. In 
both versions, however, I have overridden the default 
assumption that I called the taxi service on purpose. Because I 
can express my non-prototypical intent by adding an adverb 
(“inadvertently” in this instance) without creating a 
contradictory statement, it appears that it is not the verbal 
semantics that is the source of the default assumption. Rather, 
the assumption comes from an internalized social psychology 
that tells us that people do things for a reason and intend the 
foreseeable consequences of what they do,15 which is consistent 
with Malle and Knobe’s folk psychology of intent that includes 
both general and specific intent. This clearly holds for our 
hypothetical cab ride to the airport, where every mention of 
intent seems strangely redundant. 
By the same token, we can highlight our intent when we 
speak of everyday events by stating it explicitly. But we do so 
principally when we mean something other than the ordinary 
baseline intent of accomplishing the intended goal, such as 
getting to the airport. For example, I may say (1) (repeated as 
(5)), but only under some specific and unusual circumstances: 
(5) Mario intentionally called a taxi service and purposely asked for 
a cab to pick him up at his home a 5:15 a.m. 
Say that out of loyalty and friendship, you offer to take Mario 
to the airport in your car at some ungodly hour. You tell me 
that fact, and I utter (5) in response. By intentionally, I would 
not mean the opposite of accidentally. Rather, I would mean 
that Mario has acted with more than the ordinary intent that 
goes into calling a cab, referring to his added goal of saving you 
the inconvenience of driving him to the airport. I could finish 
the sentence by adding, “precisely so that you would not even 
think of going so far out of your way.” In such cases, the very 
  
 15 For a discussion of intent being built in to our internalized social 
psychology, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 17 (1987) and RAY 
JACKENDOFF, LANGUAGE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE 262-65 (2007). 
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expression of intent indicates that I am expressing volition 
beyond the normal intent of accomplishing the expressed goal. 
B. Praise, Blame, and Baselines of Intent 
Now let us return to our corporate executive who has 
approved a new project that will help the environment, but 
doesn’t care that it will help the environment. The puzzle with 
which we began was to find an explanation for the fact that we 
do not give him credit for his assistance. At this point, we can 
see why it is that we do not give him credit for intentionally 
helping the environment. If we said nothing about his state of 
mind, we would assume that he intended the benevolent 
consequences of his action: He approved a profitable venture 
that will help improve the environment. When we utter (6) 
under ordinary circumstances, 
(6) The CEO approved a process that is expected to be both profitable 
and environmentally friendly. 
the baseline assumption is that there is an intention not only to 
approve the process but also to achieve the foreseeable results 
of approving the process. 
Contrast this situation—the normal one—with Knobe’s 
story of the corporate executive who goes out of his way to say 
that he doesn’t care about helping the environment in deciding 
to go ahead with the new venture. That person has announced 
that his level of intent is less than the baseline, since he does 
not intend to achieve the positive foreseeable consequences of 
his action, and in fact, is callously indifferent to the good he is 
doing the world. It should not be the least bit surprising that 
people do not accept the statement that he intentionally helped 
the environment. When a person acts with more intent than 
the baseline, we make mention of it as relevant new 
information; when a person acts more or less at the baseline of 
intent, we acknowledge the intent if asked about it, although 
mentioning it overtly sounds redundant as described in the 
previous section; and when a person acts with less intent than 
the baseline, attributing intent to that individual is taken as a 
false statement. 
We can similarly explain our reaction to the version in 
which the executive was callously indifferent toward hurting 
the environment. People hearing that version tend to attribute 
intent notwithstanding that the executive does not have 
hurting the environment as an affirmative goal. This again is a 
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function of deviation from baseline expectations. We assume 
that people act within social norms to achieve socially accepted 
goals. In most academic environments, the moderator of a 
presentation need not utter (7) to the audience when the 
speaker takes the floor: 
(7) I’m sure you will behave yourselves during the presentation and 
not make noises during the talk. 
We have no reason to believe that the members of the audience 
would do such a thing, although such a statement might be 
appropriate enough in a gathering, say, of teenagers with 
emotional problems where the defaults are different, or at 
certain political events. In those situations, it might even be 
appropriate to mention that a listener accidentally disrupted a 
talk by, say, knocking over his chair, if the baseline assumption 
is that disruptions will occur with intent. 
The executive who does not care about hurting the 
environment has acted with more intent than the default level 
for a person causing harm, which is to do so inadvertently. Let 
us turn to examples of causation to see how the baselines for 
causing good and causing harm vary. Compare the following 
two sentences: 
(8) a. Mario fixed the printer. 
 b. Mario broke the printer. 
Both fix and break are causative verbs: causation is built into 
their meanings. Only if Mario actually caused the printer to be 
fixed/broken would it be appropriate to utter the sentences in 
(8). Crucially, we assume that Mario acted intentionally in (8a), 
but not in (8b). In (8b), our baseline assumption is that the 
breakage was an accident. Our default is that we break things 
by accident and fix them on purpose. These assumptions may 
be overridden by circumstances. If Mario was in the middle of a 
violent tantrum, his breaking the printer may have been one of 
many intentional acts leading to a bad outcome. But we do not 
assume that he intentionally violated social norms without our 
providing some information that will override the default 
assumption. With bad outcomes, it is not redundant to speak of 
intent specifically. Thus, there is nothing strange about (9): 
(9) Mario intentionally broke the printer. 
Since our baseline for bad outcomes is a state of mind less 
culpable than intent, attributing intent to Mario adds new 
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information, and thus does not violate the maxim of quantity 
by adding information that we already know. Similarly, some 
verbs are more loaded with intent than is break. If, for 
example, we were to substitute smash for break in (8b), we 
would be more inclined to believe that he did it on purpose in 
the first place. Expressing intent overtly when the verb is 
smash seems redundant, but not as redundant as when the 
outcomes are positive. Thus, it is easy to attribute intent to the 
executive who does not care about the harm he causes, and 
most people do just that.  
Note that intent might not be the best characterization 
of the executive’s actual state of mind. Were the choices 
expanded to those in (10), the results might have been 
different: 
(10) a. The executive intentionally caused harm to the environment. 
 b. While the executive did not intentionally cause harm to the 
environment, he is nonetheless blameworthy because he 
acted with an unacceptably callous attitude toward the 
foreseeable consequences of his decision. 
 c. The executive did not intentionally cause harm to the 
environment. 
My sense of the story is most consistent with (10b). But if I had 
only options (a) and (c) to choose from, I might opt for (a) on the 
theory that it at least recognizes that the executive has acted 
with a state of mind that is blameworthy. In contrast, (c) might 
be consistent with my not assigning blame, which would fall 
beneath my moral standards.16 
Recent studies by Guglielmo and Malle17 report results 
consistent with this intuition. They presented subjects with 
Knobe’s corporate executive story and gave them a choice of 
five characterizations of the CEO’s state of mind. Only 10% 
chose “the CEO intentionally harmed the environment,” 
whereas 70% chose “the CEO intentionally adopted a profit-
raising program that he knew would harm the environment.”18 
  
 16 Adams and Steadman make a similar point in their pragmatic explanation 
of the Knobe Effect. See Fred Adams & Annie Steadman, Intentional Action in 
Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding, 64 ANALYSIS 173 
(2004); see also Alicke, Blaming Badly, supra note 3, manuscript at 9. 
 17 Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle, Can Unintended Side Effects be 
Intentional?: Solving a Puzzle in People’s Judgments of Intentionality and Morality 
(July 2009) (unpublished manuscript, http://www.uoregon.edu/~sgugliel/pubs/ 
Guglielmo&Malle_side_effects.pdf). 
 18 Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Because there were five choices, chance performance was 20%, 
which means that subjects affirmatively rejected the 
description that the CEO harmed the environment 
intentionally.19 Notably, notwithstanding that the subjects 
distinguished between intentional and knowing acts, they 
assigned very high levels of blame, suggesting that 
intentionally causing a negative side effect is tantamount to 
intent with respect to moral culpability, even if the two are 
analytically distinct states of mind.20 
The philosopher Thomas Nadelhoffer conducted an 
experiment that provides some support for the baseline 
explanation.21 After discussing Knobe’s results, he presented 
forty college students with the following vignette: 
Imagine that Steve and Jason are two friends who are competing 
against one another in an essay competition. Jason decides to help 
Steve edit his essay. Ellen, a mutual friend, says, “Don’t you realize 
that if you help Steve, you will decrease your own chances of winning 
the competition?” Jason responds, “I know that helping Steve 
decreases my chances of winning, but I don’t care at all about that. I 
just want to help my friend!” Sure enough, Steve wins the 
competition because of Jason’s help.22 
When asked, 55% of the students said that Jason had 
intentionally decreased his own chances of winning, a 
percentage far larger than those who received the positive 
version in Knobe’s study, but far smaller than those who 
received Knobe’s negative version.23 These mixed results should 
not be surprising. I personally vacillate between understanding 
the story as one about the infliction of self-harm beyond the 
baseline (accidental, as in getting a paper cut), and as one 
about Jason’s taking a risk that he knew might mature into 
harm, but hoped that it would not. In both understandings, the 
question is how Jason’s decision matches up to what we would 
consider ordinary judgment. Hence the absence of consensus.  
If I am right about what I have said thus far, praise and 
blame operate symmetrically after all. Only when we deviate 
from the baseline do we notice intent in either direction. What 
creates the asymmetry is not that we think differently about 
  
 19 See id. at 14-15. 
 20 See id. at 26. 
 21 Thomas Nadelhoffer, On Praise, Side Effects, and Folk Ascriptions of 
Intentionality, 24 J. OF THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 196 (2004). 
 22 Id. at 209. 
 23 Id. 
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praise and blame, but that the baseline of intent is not half way 
between them. Knobe is thus correct in his claim that 
judgments of state of mind are colored by judgments of whether 
the individual is acting within acceptable norms. In turn, the 
social norms that best trigger the asymmetry may well be ones 
that contain moral content. Doris, Knobe, and Woolfolk adopt a 
similar perspective, accurately stating that “responsibility 
attribution is from the outset deeply infused with normative 
considerations.”24  
Significantly, while the Knobe Effect results from the 
application of pragmatics to the baseline intent, it cannot be 
explained by pragmatics alone.25 The key to triggering the effect 
is the baseline. What pragmatic implicature provides is 
evidence of the effect’s application in everyday discourse. 
Where we locate the baseline is not a matter of pragmatics—it 
is a matter of social norms. Once we identify the baseline, 
however, then the rest of the facts fall out from ordinary 
pragmatic implicature. We do not specify the state of mind that 
would be assumed in ordinary experience because that would 
be redundant, and thus a violation of Grice’s maxim of 
quantity. When state of mind is mentioned, it is because the 
state of mind is other than that which would be expected, and 
is thus providing new information. Our corporate executive 
who approved the environmentally-friendly process acted with 
less than the ordinary amount of intent, so it would be 
especially infelicitous for us to credit him by using language 
that assumes that he acted with at least the ordinary amount 
of intent. 
This analysis differs from other efforts to offer 
pragmatic explanations for the asymmetry between blame and 
praise. In particular, Adams and Steadman argue that the 
attribution of intent in the story with a negative outcome 
results from people’s disapproval of the conduct and expressing 
that disapproval through intent as a pragmatic matter.26 They 
argue: 
We suspect that what is going on in the minds of the folk is that they 
disapprove of the chairman’s indifference to the harm of the 
  
 24 John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk, Variantism About 
Responsibility, 21 PHIL. PERSP. 183, 197 (2007). 
 25 See Joshua Knobe & Ben Fraser, Moral Judgment and Causal Judgment: 
Two Experiments, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed.) 
(forthcoming). 
 26 See Adams & Steadman, supra note 16, at 178. 
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environment. They want to blame that indifference and they know 
that their blame is stronger and more effective at discouraging such 
acts, if the chairman is said to have done the action intentionally.27 
While there may be some bootstrapping of this sort, this 
explanation does not appear to be adequate to explain the 
range of data. For example, Steven Sverdlik has found that 
when given the opportunity, people are perfectly willing to find 
conduct both blameworthy and unintentional at the same 
time.28 In Sverdlik’s studies, this happens when someone knows 
that he will cause discomfort, would rather not cause that 
discomfort, but does it anyway, accepting the side effect of his 
actions.29 A person is considered blameworthy for mowing his 
lawn early in the morning knowing that it will wake the 
neighbors, recognizing that he did this without specific intent.30 
For that matter, we find the consequences of negligent action to 
be blameworthy, without ascribing any intent at all. 
C. Causation and Outcome 
Help and harm are causative verbs. Causation is 
embedded in their meaning. You cannot harm someone without 
causing that person to be worse off, and you cannot help a 
person without causing that person to be better off. As John 
Darley and I point out in an earlier article, people do not 
always agree upon whether a person caused an outcome or 
whether that person did not cause the outcome, but set the 
conditions that enabled the outcome to happen.31 In an 
experimental study, we found that the more culpable an 
individual, the more people tended to consider that person the 
cause of a bad outcome. For example, when an individual left 
his keys in the ignition of a car, and the car was stolen by a 
teenager who in turn injured a pedestrian, people were more 
likely to call the key-leaver a cause of the accident when he 
intentionally left his keys in the car than when he did so 
innocently. 
  
 27 Id. at 178. 
 28 Steven Sverdlik, Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense 
Thought About Action, 24 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 224, 234 (2004).  
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 226-30. 
 31 Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution and Legal 
Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001). 
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Mark Alicke reached similar conclusions.32 He presented 
people with a story about an accident which may or may not 
have been the fault of the protagonist.33 In one version, the 
protagonist was on his way home to give a gift to his parents, 
in another, to involve himself with drugs.34 People were far 
more likely to blame him for causing the accident when he was 
up to no good, even though the description of the accident 
remained constant.35 
Knobe and Fraser have conducted studies with similar 
results.36 Two people with equal opportunity to service an office 
machine fail to do so: one is responsible for maintaining the 
machine, the other is not. We say that the failure of the 
responsible person caused the machine to break when it does so 
because it has not been properly maintained. 
What the studies have in common is that they begin 
with stories in which causation is equivocal. In ours, it is 
equivocal because we can conceptualize the situation as being 
either causation or enablement. In Alicke’s, causation is 
equivocal because subjects were confronted with a set of facts 
susceptible to different causal explanations. And in Knobe and 
Fraser’s it is equivocal because the cause, if there was one, was 
the failure to interrupt a process that was otherwise occurring. 
In all three cases, subjects’ moral judgment contributed to 
whether they believed that the protagonist had caused harm. 
Thus, while people appear able to judge intent and blame 
independently,37 an actor’s state of mind does influence 
judgments about causation when causation is equivocal, and 
judgments of causation influence the extent to which that 
person is held responsible.  
Returning to Knobe’s story of the corporate executives, 
just as people construe intent asymmetrically, they may 
construe causation asymmetrically as well. That is, if subjects 
had been asked whether the boss hurt or helped the 
environment without any mention of his state of mind, we 
might expect to see the same effect, although perhaps 
somewhat weaker. That is because, just as the Knobe Effect 
requires that there be some range of possible states of mind for 
  
 32 Alicke, Culpable Causation, supra note 3, at 369. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 370. 
 36 See Knobe & Fraser, supra note 25. 
 37 See Sverdlik, supra note 28, at 234. 
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the actor, the examples used to illustrate the phenomena also 
contain some uncertainty about causation. Moral judgment, it 
thus seems, contributes to attributions of both state of mind 
and causation when language and circumstance leave open 
more than one possibility.  
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
A. Laws as High Expectation Signals 
There is no doubt that the psychology behind our 
attributions of intent, causation, and moral responsibility is of 
legal relevance. As Robinson and Darley have noted, the legal 
system becomes suspect in the eyes of citizens when it uses 
definitions that are at odds with their everyday moral 
judgments.38 I will not pursue this issue in detail here, but it is 
worth noting that the law’s distinction between general and 
specific intent is quite unnatural, and might be the subject of 
interesting experimental research.  
The asymmetry between the assignment of intent in 
good and bad outcomes may help to explain significant aspects 
of the legal system’s structure. In the eighteenth century, 
Blackstone noticed in his introduction to the Commentaries on 
the Laws of England that legal systems tend to organize 
themselves around expecting people to behave within the legal 
rules, and punish them for failing to do so: 
[W]e find that those civil laws, which enforce and enjoin our duty, do 
seldom, if ever, propose any privilege or gift to such as obey that law; 
but do constantly come armed with a penalty denounced against 
transgressors, either expressly defining the nature and quantity of 
the punishment, or else leaving it to the discretion of the judges, and 
those who are entrusted with the care of putting the laws in 
execution.39 
The account of praising and blaming discussed in this 
essay predicts that this should be so. Our baseline expectation 
in everyday life is compliance with social norms, with the 
attribution of blame for those who fail to do so. It should not be 
at all surprising that we organize our legal system around the 
way we think about praise and blame in ordinary life as 
reflected both in language use and in judgment about moral 
  
 38 PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: 
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995). 
 39 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *56. 
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attribution, as the work of Knobe and others illustrates. In fact, 
that legal systems are structured around defining illegal 
conduct, tempered by excuses and justifications, may well be 
universal.  
John Mikhail’s contribution to this Symposium suggests 
that this approach is on the right track. Mikhail (with the help 
of research assistants), has examined homicide statutes in 163 
jurisdictions from around the world.40 All 163 jurisdictions have 
homicide statutes, and all 163 statutes have a mental state 
element. In addition, some justifications, such as self-defense, 
and some excuses, such as diminished mental capacity, appear 
universal, although others, including duress, necessity, and 
provocation, are not. Nonetheless, the structure of the law—a 
basic prohibition, tempered by excuses and justifications—does 
seem to be characteristic of every legal system studied.41 
This is by no means the only way for a legal system to 
organize itself. Economists point out that the withholding of a 
benefit for those who fail to engage in desired conduct has the 
same economic effect as giving the benefit generally, and 
imposing a sanction on those who do not engage in the 
conduct.42 The tax system is replete with “tax expenditures” 
that have this structure. The most notable in today’s news is 
the mortgage interest deduction, which encourages people to 
incur debt to become homeowners. Various kinds of energy tax 
credits also create incentives for people to engage in desirable 
behavior. As Professor Wolfman noted more than twenty years 
ago, illustrating his point with an example that is still current 
today, 
If a special exclusion from an oil company’s income were recognized 
as the equivalent of a subsidy (because taxpayers in other businesses 
are denied a similar exclusion), the congressional debate might focus 
more sharply on just who benefits, on whether the subsidy is wise 
  
 40 John Mikhail, Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal?: Evidence from 
Comparative Criminal Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 497 (2009). 
 41 Id. 
 42 The point has also become part of the legal discourse. See, e.g., Christopher 
Serkin, Existing Uses and The Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009) (“Of course, as many have observed, it is hard to find a limiting 
principle that distinguishes between a regulation preventing a harm and a regulation 
conferring a benefit, but that such a line even needs to be drawn demonstrates that 
existing uses are normally protected.”). 
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policy and, if so, on whether Congress can better achieve its objective 
through direct expenditure or through the tax system.43 
Yet people do not experience the imposition of a tax the 
same as the withholding of a benefit. In a series of very 
interesting studies, Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron 
have explored some of these reactions by asking people to react 
to various scenarios relating to taxation and its economic 
equivalents.44 As these authors point out, a tax bonus for those 
who have children is financially equivalent to a tax penalty for 
those who do not have children.45 In both cases, people with 
children will pay less than people without children. What 
changes are the defaults. In one instance, a society says that 
we assume that you do not have children, but if you do, then 
you can pay less tax than the default. In the other, a society 
says that we assume that you do have children, but if you don’t, 
you will have to pay a surcharge above the normal tax amount. 
Not surprisingly, McCaffery and Baron found that people 
strongly prefer bonuses to surcharges. They are willing to 
accept a bonus for marriage or for children, but not a surcharge 
for being single or childless, even though they come to exactly 
the same amount in terms of dollars taxed.46 The literature on 
behavioral law and economics discusses other ways in which 
people react asymmetrically to situations that are financially 
equivalent as the result of framing effects.47 
These results are consistent with the explanation of the 
Knobe Effect presented in this essay. People are quick to blame 
individuals for conduct falling beneath the baseline of 
acceptable behavior. They are indeed willing to reward when 
conduct rises above the baseline, but the baseline is relatively 
high, making blame scenarios more prevalent. Not having 
children does not fall below any standard of acceptable social 
  
 43 Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 491, 493 (1985) (reviewing STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX 
EXPENDITURES (1985)). 
 44 See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 106 (2006). 
 45 Id. at 114-15. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 
in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 147, 150-53 
(Terry Connolly, Hal R. Arkes, & Kenneth R. Hammond, eds., 2d ed. 2000). For 
discussion in legal contexts, see Russell B. Korobkin & Russell Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1108 (2000) and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Loses, and the 
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996). 
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conduct in our society, however. Thus, people are reluctant to 
penalize others for not having children, although they are 
willing to reward those who do on the theory that raising 
children produces some social good beyond that which is 
required of all citizens. 
We do not, however, generally structure our laws as 
incentives to avoid fines and prison sentences for obeying the 
law, even if they can be accurately characterized that way. 
Staying with the tax code, criminal laws do not say, “Whoever 
pays his taxes shall not be fined,” nor do we give a bonus to 
people who pay their taxes, perhaps in the form of a periodic 
tax amnesty. Rather, we enact laws that punish people who 
break the law. 
We could do otherwise, and do otherwise in other 
institutional settings. Staying close to home, many law schools 
have summer research stipend programs to encourage faculty 
to write productively. A law school that pays faculty members 
ten percent of their salary in exchange for writing an article 
during the summer months could, consistent with the 
framework of legal systems that I have described, raise the 
salaries of all faculty members, and then withhold 9.1% of the 
salaries of those faculty members who do not write during the 
summer. Although economically equivalent, the punitive 
system would be experienced as just that: a punitive system, 
and would be demoralizing. Thus, in some kinds of settings, we 
prefer incentives for good conduct to punishment for bad 
conduct. 
Nonetheless, the principal generalization holds: legal 
systems are chiefly structured around punishment for the 
violation of legal rules. The fact that they could equivalently be 
stated in terms of incentives is irrelevant. This is a significant 
by-product of the Knobe Effect, which in turn, is a by-product of 
our setting baseline conduct on the side of high expectations of 
good conduct for good reason. Recognizing the source of this 
orientation might give policy makers more flexibility in 
deciding when to override it. The most natural way to think 
may not be the most productive way to think when it comes to 
such matters as the creation of an efficient and productive 
economic system. 
B. Knowledge of Side Effects as Intent in Tort Law 
The fact that we have a high baseline expectation 
explains in part why we prefer punishment for bad conduct to 
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reward for good conduct in our legal systems, but it says 
nothing about whether a legal system will reflect Knobe’s 
finding with respect to those whose acts lead to bad side effects: 
that the legal system will attribute intent. It is entirely 
possible to structure a legal system around punishment, but 
not hold those who knowingly cause negative side effects 
responsible for having done so intentionally. 
Significantly, the law generally acts in conformity with 
this aspect of Knobe’s work as well. The law does not apply 
evenly, but in broad strokes it reflects the moral intuitions of 
Knobe’s experimental subjects. This is an important point, 
because, as Robinson and Darley argue forcefully, respect for 
the criminal law is in large part contingent upon its reflecting 
the everyday intuitions of the citizens to whom it applies.48 To 
the extent that the law treats lightly those who act 
intentionally, knowing—but not intending—the bad side effects 
of their acts, the law will be seen as encouraging immoral 
behavior. Consider Section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts: 
The word “intent” is used throughout the Restatement of this 
Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his 
act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain 
to result from it.49 
Comment b then explains: 
All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are 
intended, as the word is used in this Restatement. Intent is not, 
however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor 
knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to 
result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if 
he had in fact desired to produce the result.50 
The Restatement provides the following illustration: 
1. A throws a bomb into B’s office for the purpose of killing B. A 
knows that C, B’s stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to 
injure C, but knows that his act is substantially certain to do so. C is 
injured by the explosion. A is subject to liability to C for an 
intentional tort.51 
  
 48 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 38, at 201-02. 
 49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (emphasis added). 
 50 Id. cmt. b. 
 51 Id. illus. 1. 
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Significantly, the Restatement does not say that knowledge and 
intent are indistinguishable. Rather, it says that those who act 
with knowledge that their act will cause harm are held to the 
same level of responsibility as those who do act with intent. 
Thus, the Restatement’s position is consistent with the results 
of Guglielmo and Malle reported above,52 and with my own 
analysis, which suggests that subjects recognize the difference 
between knowledge and intent, but judge acts with known 
negative side effects harshly because the conduct falls so far 
below the baseline of societal expectations.53 
To see the application of this principle in more detail,54 
consider Vision Air Flight Service v. M/V National Pride,55 a 
case decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1998. The plaintiff had 
sold two airplane refueling trucks to a buyer for use in an 
airport in the Philippines. The defendant company was 
responsible for shipping the trucks. When it removed the first 
of the two trucks from the ship using a crane, it damaged the 
truck severely. The cable harness that was put around the 
refueling truck tightened up around the vehicle and literally 
crushed it. That was a negligent act, and under the terms of 
the contract, the shipper was responsible only for $500 per 
truck. But then the shipper off-loaded the second refueling 
truck in exactly the same manner, and destroyed that truck 
too.56 Under a doctrine of admiralty law called “deviation,” the 
$500 liability limit does not apply if a carrier intentionally 
destroys the goods it contracts to carry,57 so the issue in the 
case was whether the destruction of the second truck should be 
considered an intentional act.  
Citing the Restatement, the court held that a person acts 
intentionally if the “consequences [of his act] are substantially 
certain” to occur.58 After holding that the destruction of the first 
truck cannot be considered intentional as a matter of law, the 
court concluded: 
  
 52 Guglielmo & Malle, supra note 17, at 24-26. 
 53 See supra Part I. 
 54 The classic illustration used in Torts casebooks is Garret v. Dailey, 279 
P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955), where the question was whether a child who pulled a 
chair out from under an adult who was about to sit down had committed a battery even 
though the child meant no harm. 
 55 155 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 56 Id. at 1167-68. 
 57 Id. at 1175. 
 58 Id. at 1176 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)). 
2009] BLAME, PRAISE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL RULES 537 
 
The same, however, cannot be said with respect to the second 
refueler. The severe damage to the first refueler that resulted from 
off-loading was visible upon removal of the cable strapping as the 
refueler sat on the pier. Nevertheless, the stevedores proceeded to 
off-load the second refueler in precisely the same manner as the 
first. Because the uncontroverted evidence suggests the stevedores 
were aware of the damage their chosen method of off-loading 
inflicted on the first refueler, a rational trier of fact might very well 
conclude that they knew the second refueler would suffer the same 
fate with substantial certainty.59 
The court’s ruling is consistent with Section 8A of the 
Restatement (Second) and with the observations of Knobe and 
others that our moral intuitions tend to consider an 
undesirable side effect (i.e., the destruction of the truck) to be 
as blameworthy as an intentional act when the actor knows in 
advance that it will happen and acts anyway. Thus, at least in 
this instance, tort law and everyday moral judgment seem to be 
in harmony. 
But the law is not uniform in its treatment of this issue. 
First, as Kobick and Knobe point out in their contribution to 
this Symposium, courts do not always impose liability for 
known negative side effects.60 They discuss a 2009 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in which the Shell Oil Company was 
held not to have acted intentionally when pesticides carried as 
cargo leaked from its tanker, as routinely happens when 
chemicals are offloaded.61 The EPA spent some $8 million to 
clean up the spill, and then sued Shell under CERCLA to 
recover the cleanup costs.62 The statute would hold Shell liable 
if it had “arranged for [the] disposal . . . of hazardous 
substances.”63 This, according to Kobick and Knobe is a classic 
case of a company desiring only to engage in profitable activity, 
but acting with knowledge that it will cause environmental 
harm as a side effect. Shell did not act with the purpose of 
polluting the environment, it acted for the purpose of delivering 
chemicals that it had sold. Nonetheless, it knew that the spill 
would occur, and delivered the chemicals anyway.64 
  
 59 Id. 
 60 Julia Kobik & Joshua Knobe, Interpreting Intent: How Research on Folk 
Judgments of Intentionality Can Inform Statutory Analysis, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 409 
(2009). 
 61 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1883-84 
(2009). 
 62 Id. at 1876. 
 63 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2006). 
 64 Kobik & Knobe, supra note 60. 
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The Supreme Court ruled 8-1 in favor of Shell,65 a ruling 
seemingly inconsistent with the moral intuitions uncovered in 
one experiment after another. Why would there be such 
consensus on a position that appears to be at odds with 
everyday intuitions? Perhaps the word “arrange” suggests a 
desire to accomplish the consequences. Had the statute merely 
required reimbursement for an actor that “intentionally 
disposed of hazardous substances,” the result would have been 
different. But this does not diminish Kobick and Knobe’s point. 
Rather, it suggests that it might have been Congress that acted 
outside ordinary moral standards, and the Court merely 
followed suit. Whichever branch of government is responsible 
for the gap between moral judgment and the law, the gap 
remains, as Kobick and Knobe demonstrate.  
At the same time, some courts have imposed liability for 
intentional acts when the actor knew that the side effect would 
occur at some point in time, but did not actually know that it 
would occur in this particular instance. This liability for 
knowledge that harm will come to some victim, but without 
knowledge that it will come to the particular individual who 
suffered, goes beyond the intuitions reflected in studies that 
Knobe has conducted, and, for that matter, is controversial 
among courts and commentators.66 
Consider one of Knobe’s scenarios: a lieutenant orders a 
sergeant to send his troops up Thompson Hill. The sergeant 
responds: “But if I send my squad to the top of Thompson Hill, 
we’ll be moving the men directly into the enemy’s line of fire. 
Some of them will surely be killed!”67 Some of the men are killed 
once the troops ascend the hill, and consistent with Knobe’s 
other studies, participants in this study say that the lieutenant 
acted with intent in causing the soldiers’ deaths.68 Knobe did 
not investigate how subjects would react to the question of 
whether the lieutenant intentionally caused the death of any 
particular soldier who died on Thompson Hill. In his scenario, 
the prediction that some troops will die matches the fact that 
some troops did die. The lieutenant surely knew that each 
individual soldier was at risk of dying, and that at least some of 
the soldiers would actually die. But he did not know if some 
  
 65 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 129 S. Ct. 1870. 
 66 For discussion of the different positions taken by the various courts, see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 67 Knobe, supra note 6, at 932 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68 Id. at 933. 
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individual soldier, call him Bill, would be one of the casualties. 
Whether there would be consensus that the lieutenant 
intentionally caused Bill’s death remains an open question. 
To illustrate, consider Parret v. Unicco Service 
Company, a 2005 case decided by the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma.69 An employee (Parret) of a maintenance company 
(Unicco) was electrocuted while replacing emergency lights at a 
Bridgestone tire plant in Oklahoma City. Bridgestone was a 
client of Unicco. Working on a lighting system that was not 
electrically disabled was considered dangerous by both the 
maintenance company and Bridgestone. Because Parret was 
killed on the job and in the course of his employment, Parret’s 
wife was limited to the benefits afforded under Oklahoma’s 
workers’ compensation system. However, the Oklahoma 
worker’s compensation statute has an exception for those who 
are injured or killed by an intentional act. Unlike other 
workers, they are entitled to sue in court for tort damages. 
Parret’s widow sued Unicco and Bridgestone, alleging that the 
two companies should be held to have intentionally caused her 
husband’s death.70 
The case went to the state supreme court, which ruled 
that an act should count as intentional for purposes of workers’ 
compensation law when the employer knew with reasonable 
certainty that the injury (or death in this case) would occur. 
The opinion is written narrowly in this respect: 
Thus, the employer must have acted, or have failed to act, with the 
knowledge that injury was substantially certain, not merely likely, 
to occur. The employer must have knowledge of more than 
“foreseeable risk,” more than “high probability,” and more than 
“substantial likelihood.” Nothing short of the employer’s knowledge 
of the “substantial certainty” of injury will remove the injured 
worker’s claim from the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act, thus allowing the worker to proceed in district 
court.71 
Regardless of how the court stated the rule, however, 
the question in that case was not whether the employer and 
client wanted him dead—of course they didn’t. Rather, it was 
whether their knowledge of the risk that someone would die 
sooner or later if workers were ordered to do such dangerous 
work amounted to knowledge, which in turn would imply 
  
 69 127 P.3d 572 (Okla. 2005). 
 70 Id. at 574. 
 71 Id. at 579. 
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intent. This additional step in reasoning goes beyond the moral 
intuitions that Knobe tested. 
New Jersey has moved even further toward risk and 
away from actual knowledge as the basis for attributing intent 
to negative side effects. Laidlaw v. Hariton Machinery Co., a 
2002 case,72 involved an employee who was severely injured on 
the job when his gloved hand got caught in a machine into 
which he was feeding material as part of a manufacturing 
project. The employer had disabled the safety guard that could 
have avoided the accident, although it periodically put the 
guard in place when it knew that inspectors would be coming to 
the plant. As of the date of the accident, no one had been 
injured by the machine, although there had been at least one 
close call, and the injured employee himself had expressed 
concern about the machines being unsafe when operated by 
new, inexperienced employees.73 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the 
employer should not have been granted summary judgment 
because a reasonable juror could have found that the employer 
knew with substantial certainty that a serious injury might 
ensue from using the machine without the safety device.74 
The injurer’s state of mind in these two cases is subtly 
different. In the Oklahoma case, the employer assigned a task 
to a series of people that sooner or later was bound to injure or 
kill someone. In the New Jersey case, the same employee 
performed the task repeatedly until he was hurt.  
Professor Sebok,75 commenting on the criticism of these 
extensions of intentional tort in an article by Professors 
Henderson and Twerski,76 refers to the scenarios as the 
“iterated low risk act” and the “iterated low risk victim.”77 Both 
articles comment on the Discussion Draft of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, which adopts the “substantial certainty” 
extension of intent.78 Henderson and Twerski are concerned not 
  
 72 790 A.2d 884 (N.J. 2002). 
 73 Id. at 887-88. 
 74 Id. at 897. 
 75 See Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the 
Restatement (Third)’s Definitions of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165 (2001). 
 76 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness 
in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating the Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133 (2001). 
 77 Sebok, supra note 75, at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78 The then-current draft discussed in these articles was RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (ALI Reporter Discussion Draft Fall 
1999). 
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with the basic notion that a person who knows that his act will 
result in injury should be held to have caused that injury 
intentionally, but rather with the failure of the Restatement’s 
definitions to preclude courts from expanding that principle to 
include the iterated low risk victim and iterated low risk act 
cases.79 Professor Sebok would solve the problem by eliminating 
the principle altogether: an intentional tort is a tort committed 
with intent. Basic negligence law should be good enough, he 
argues, to take care of the other cases.80 As an alternative, 
Professor Simons suggests that the kinds of cases that generate 
these problems, such as the maritime cases and workers’ 
compensation cases discussed above, should be treated 
separately from basic tort law, again permitting the concept of 
intentional torts to be reduced to a simple one in which the tort 
is committed with the consequence intended as well.81 
In both of these problematic scenarios, the line that has 
blurred is the line between knowledge that harm will come to 
the plaintiff here and now, and knowledge that harm will come 
sooner or later (whether to this plaintiff or to someone else) if 
the activity continues. In essence, these cases occur on the 
border between intentional and reckless conduct, a notoriously 
vague border to characterize.82 Thus, it should not be entirely 
surprising that some judges regard as intentional torts harm 
caused by egregiously reckless conduct. The comments to the 
Discussion Draft of the Restatement (Third) recognize the 
controversial nature of these extensions, and attempt to limit 
their impact.83 
  
 79 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 76, at 1136-37. 
 80 See Sebok, supra note 75, at 1174-76. 
 81 See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1096 (2006). 
 82 See Sebok, supra note 75, at 1174-75; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The 
Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111, 133-40 (2008). 
 83 “The applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to 
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty that the 
conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone within a small class 
of potential victims within a localized area. The test loses its persuasiveness when the 
identity of potential victims becomes vaguer, and when in a related way the time frame 
involving the actor’s conduct expands and the causal sequence connecting conduct and 
harm becomes more complex.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
HARM § 1 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Attributions of intent are indeed infused with moral 
judgment, but indirectly so. It is not the case that we decide 
asymmetrically whether someone acted intentionally 
depending on the good or harm that was caused. Rather, we 
attribute intent when an actor’s state of mind equals or exceeds 
the baseline norm for intentional activity. This baseline, in 
turn, is not situated half way between acting for the good and 
acting for nefarious purposes. Rather, it is skewed highly 
toward morally defensible and useful conduct. The result is 
that we are likely to ascribe intent to side effects that fall below 
the baseline more readily because unwanted positive effects are 
themselves below the baseline, a point also made by the 
philosopher Thomas Nadelhoffer.84 The baseline itself tells us 
that positive side effects should not be unwanted.  
This account has serious ramifications for legal systems. 
First, it suggests that legal systems are likely to expect the 
good and disapprove of the bad, rather than expecting the bad 
and rewarding the good. If people generally set their baselines 
high, there is no reason for legal systems to do otherwise. This 
prediction is borne out. 
Secondly, the negative branch of the Knobe Effect—that 
people do indeed attribute intent to unintended negative side 
effects when the actor knew that they would occur—should also 
find its reflex in the law if the law does a good job reflecting our 
moral intuitions. This prediction is borne out as well, although 
somewhat unevenly. As Kobick and Knobe point out, courts 
and legislatures sometimes let actors off the hook for the 
unintended but known negative consequences of their action.85 
On the other hand, some courts have imposed liability on 
actors for side effects that they did not know would occur, but 
which they knew might occur if the activity continued. This is 
an extension of the experimental results on moral judgment, 
and remains controversial within the legal community.  
Despite these issues, which are themselves ripe for 
additional inquiry, the law of torts indeed treats as intentional 
the known unintended negative consequences of an act. 
Whether people actually construe the known negative side 
effects of intentional acts as themselves intentional or whether 
  
 84 Nadelhoffer, supra note 21. 
 85 Kobick & Knobe, supra note 60. 
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they recognize the difference between the two but attribute the 
same degree of moral blame, the law appears to be in harmony 
with these intuitions. At least in its black letter statement 
then, the law tracks moral judgment quite well. This 
relationship between legal doctrine and experimental results 
suggests that the work being conducted in experimental 
philosophy and cognitive psychology can indeed make a 
contribution to mainstream legal discourse. Whether or not we 
insist that the law track the moral judgments of the citizenry, 
at the very least we should wish to know the extent to which it 
does, and to assess the cost of any gaps between the two 
against the benefits of whatever social or economic good legal 
principles at odds with moral judgments might bring.  
